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BOOK REVIEW

EXPENSIVE SPEECH
By Rodney A.
Smolla. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 277.
$18.95.

SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, AND POWER.

REVIEWED BY NEIL SKENE*

Tom Wicker dates modern press-bashing from the night of July
14, 1964, when Dwight D. Eisenhower told delegates to the Republican National Convention not to let themselves be divided by
"those outside our family, including sensation-seeking columnists
and commentators."' Mr. Wicker recalls his astonishment at the
"shouting, livid delegates, rising almost as one man, pointing, cursing, in some cases shaking their fists, not just at the men in the
glass booths but at me."' 2 He feared that some delegates might leap
over the railing and attack the reporters, who were "gazing in
astonishment at this sudden surge of hatred."
Of course, even the ancient Greeks punished the messenger for
the message. Given the number and proximity of the aroused
Republicans or the fatal nature of the Greek retribution, journalists might appreciate the relative civility of a libel suit. If it were
not already obvious that lawsuits against the press have become
legal monstrosities, Professor Ronald A. Smolla makes it obvious
with his new study of some of the most publicized libel cases of the
1980's. Suing the Press is distinguished by its balance. It neglects
neither the importance of free speech nor the value of individual
reputation. Professor Smolla discusses cases, such as New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,4 that were abominable abuses of the libel
claim. He also describes cases, such as Carol Burnett's suit against
the National Enquirer,' that arose from abominable conduct by
* Executive Editor, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1973, Vanderbilt
University; J.D., 1977, Mercer University. Editor, Evening Independent, St. Petersburg,
Florida, 1984-1986.
1. T. WICKER, ON PRESS 1 (1975).
2. Id. (emphasis in original).
3. Id.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981).
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the press. Between these extremes are a host of other disputes for
which libel law as it is now constituted is poorly suited.
A passage from Professor Smolla's opening pages is worth quoting at some length because it demonstrates his effort to view these
noted libel cases, and the law of libel generally, from different
perspectives:
The current explosion of litigation against the media poses a
long list of intriguing questions. Why do plaintiffs sue the press?
Is it money they seek? Vengeance? Restoration of honor? How
important is the protection of reputation in our society, and how
important should it be? Are libel suits a manifestation of a growing recognition of a new form of "civil right," a manifestation of
concern for human dignity that is primarily directed at protecting
emotional and mental tranquillity? Or are libel suits a sign of a
new national narcissism, a narcissism that provokes violent responses to excessive media criticism of individuals and national
institutions? ... Has the press grown too powerful, too arrogant,
too oracular in tone? When the press makes errors that injure
reputations, are the errors usually innocent, or are they often the
result of careless or even reckless work? . .. How often is what
purports to be a battle over "truth" really a battle of competing
ideologies? . . . What sorts of emerging cultural attitudes, biases,
and perceptions are shaping jury verdicts? What is the social cost,
in terms of court time, legal fees, and other "societal overhead" of
libel litigation? . . . What is the toll that anti-media litigation
takes on First Amendment values? . . . What alternatives, if any,
exist to the present legal process for arbitrating conflicts between
individual privacy and free expression? 6
The answers to all of these questions are in the eye of the beholder, for Professor Smolla offers few answers of his own. One
could easily conclude from his book that the litigants all deserve
each other. It is difficult to muster much constitutional sympathy
for the National Enquirer, whose reporter simply made up the
story that Carol Burnett was boisterous in a Washington restaurant, but it is also hard to imagine that Carol Burnett, who has
grown rich and famous from publicity of all types, suffered multimillion-dollar damages from a few lines in a grocery-store tabloid.
It is clear that CBS News abandoned ethics and objectivity in putting together its documentary on General William Westmoreland,
"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," but it is also
6.

R. SMOLLA,

SUING THE

PREss 7-8 (1986) (citations omitted).
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clear that some intelligent people strongly believed that Westmoreland had massaged the estimates of enemy troop strength. The
Washington Post, in reporting that Mobil Oil President William
Tavoulareas "set up" his son Peter in a lucrative shipping business, simply drew conclusions from selected facts and omitted
some facts exculpatory to Mr. Tavoulareas. As Professor Smolla
puts it:
Does anyone in their heart of hearts really believe that a twentyfour year old named 'Peter Sixpack' making $16,500 a year would
have been brought in as an equity partner in a lucrative million
dollar shipping deal without putting up any front money? Of
course it made
a difference that Peter's last name was
7
Tavoulareas.
Suing the Press benefits from this kind of refreshingly direct
analysis, which contrasts with the stodgy language of most legal
scholarship. Both the connoisseur and the novice in the field of
libel will find the book readable and enlightening. It often has a
journalistic quality, producing realism and understanding that
reaches beyond the casebooks. The journalistic prose, however, occasionally sounds a bit like Geraldo Rivera; for example, a passage
from the Westmoreland chapter regarding the battle of Khesahn
reads: "And in the end, like the lawsuit Westmoreland v. CBS, the
battle just stopped, as arbitrarily as it had begun, when, after General William Westmoreland ended his tour of Vietnam duty, the
United States forces simply packed up and left. They're still there,
and we're all gone." 8

I. FROM Sullivan TO Heilman
"If you can't call Lillian Hellman a liar on national TV," a writer
in Harper's once wondered, "what's the First Amendment all
about?" 9 Lillian Hellman made a career of controversy and nasty
remarks. She made speeches supporting the Spanish Loyalists. She
wrote bitterly about the darker side of children in her 1934 play,
The Children's Hour. She was doctrinaire in attacking evil as she
saw it and dramatically defied the House Un-American Activities
Committee. She carried on running feuds with novelist Mary McCarthy and others. When writer Diana Trilling was quoted as say7. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 237.
9. Kaus, The Plaintiff's Hour, HARPER'S, Mar. 1983, at 14.
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ing that "anyone who entertains me is never again invited to Lillian Hellman's house," Miss Hellman was quoted as responding: "I
have no idea who invites Mrs. Trilling to dinner. I do not live my
life in quite so high fashion, but then I also do not stand in front of
a mirror all day."10
Miss McCarthy likewise made a career of sharp remarks about
literary figures. She had been criticizing Miss Hellman's work for
more than thirty years before she appeared on the Dick Cavett television show early in 1980. The talk on the show turned to overrated authors.
Mary McCarthy: The only one I can think of is a holdover like
Lillian Hellman, who I think is tremendously overrated, a bad
writer, and dishonest writer, but she really belongs to the past, to
the Steinbeck past, not that she is a writer like Steinbeck.
Dick Cavett: What is dishonest about her?
Mary McCarthy: Everything. But I said once in some interview
that every word she writes is a lie, including "and" and "the. 1 1
The audience laughed, but obviously not Lillian Hellman. Miss
Hellman sued Mary McCarthy for $2.25 million. Miss Hellman
died, however, before the case could go to trial. As Professor
Smolla says, it was a case between "two brilliant American writers
and visible cultural figures," and the "only sure consequence
[would have been] less freedom and literary honesty for all
1' 2
writers.
Courtrooms are hardly the place for a determination of whether
Lillian Hellman is a "dishonest" writer. In a work of fiction, of
course, every word is indeed a lie, though it is often argued that
fiction can reveal a larger truth. It is likewise true that facts can
"lie," or lead to erroneous conclusions. Those ethereal matters
aside, Miss McCarthy was clearly stating a literary opinion-a
harsh and exaggerated opinion, but a literary opinion nonetheless.
Even though Miss Hellman's lawsuit withstood a motion to dismiss,' 8 it is surely not the sort of dispute that is suitable for resolution in court.
Yet it is the sort of dispute that is showing up more in libel litigation. The libel suit has become the forum for debating a variety
10. Id. at 15.
11. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 63 (quoting transcript).
12. Id. at 65.
13. Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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of public issues. The plaintiffs are often merely symbols of larger
controversies; General Westmoreland, for example, symbolized the
United States' conduct of the Vietnam war. Sharp, exaggerated
criticism of famous people is an American tradition dating back to
John Peter Zenger's published comments on the corruption and
oppression of the royal governor in colonial New York. Thomas
Jefferson was called a libertine, an atheist, and a spendthrift.' 4
The United States Supreme Court injected this tradition into
the law of libel when it decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'6
Erroneous statements are "inevitable in free debate" and, in the
context of libel suits, should be considered "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen."'" The Court even quoted John Stuart Mill's famous view
that false statements can themselves contribute to public debate
by bringing about "the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error."' 7 To protect free
debate about public officials, the court declared that public officials
could not win libel suits unless they proved that the defendant
acted with what the court misleadingly called "actual malice"-with knowledge that a statement was false or with "reckless
disregard" for whether it was true.' 8
The facts of the Sullivan case made it painfully obvious to the
Supreme Court that libel law could be used to harass those who
published unpopular ideas. The Times representatives in the Alabama courtroom in 1960 must have felt as Tom Wicker felt the
night of President Eisenhower's speech to the Republican convention. The plaintiff was the city police commissioner, L.B. Sullivan,
and the claim was that an advertisement in the Times, entitled
Heed Their Rising Voices, had libeled him with its passionate calls
for justice for Martin Luther King, Jr. Only 394 of the 650,000 copies of the Times circulated in Alabama, but that had been enough
to give the Alabama courts jurisdiction over the newspaper.' 9 The
advertisement had several errors. A song sung by black students
during a demonstration was not "My Country, Tis of Thee" but
14. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 16.
15.
16.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
17. Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1947)).
18. Id. at 279-80.
19. This use of tiny circulation to give a state jurisdiction over a publication was later
specifically approved in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
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the national anthem. Nine students had been expelled from college, not for leading the demonstration as the advertisement said,
but for demanding service at a segregated lunch counter. Police
never "ringed" the campus, although they were there in large numbers. Dr. King had been arrested not seven times but four (which,
ironically, probably could have been construed as defamation of
Dr. King). There were other such errors. Nowhere, however, was
L.B. Sullivan mentioned.
Dislike for the Times was so great that the newspaper had
trouble finding an Alabama lawyer to represent it. The trial judge,
who had earlier published a document called The Confederate
Creed, declared during the case that the fourteenth amendment
"has no standing whatever in this Court."2 0 Commissioner Sullivan's lawyers repeatedly used the term "nigger." 2 1 The lawyers also
concocted an amazing argument: They said the advertisement,
though not naming Commissioner Sullivan, imputed bad conduct
to him because of his supervisory role over the police, yet they
used the fact that many of the incidents described had nothing to
do with Sullivan to prove that the statements imputing improper
conduct to him were false. The Alabama jury bought the argument
and returned a verdict for $500,000 against the Times. More libel
suits from Alabama officials were pending.
The Supreme Court's reversal of the verdict and its incorporation of first amendment principles into the law of libel were viewed
as the beginning of the end of libel suits by public officials. The
optimism of the press was enhanced later by the extension of the
New York Times principles to "public figures," such as a university football coach 2" and a retired army general,23 and to private
persons involved in matters of public interest.2
So how does it happen that, two decades later, Lillian Hellman,
William Westmoreland, Carol Burnett, and a host of others are filing libel suits? It certainly reflects more than narcissism; even the
thinnest-skinned soul would not rationally undertake litigation
that is doomed to fail. The broad answer is that the expansion of
free speech protection in libel cases was curtailed after 1971, when
20. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 33.
21. Id.
22. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
23. Id. (Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), consolidated with Curtis Publishing Co.).
24. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Lewis Powell, Harry
Blackmun, and William Rehnquist replaced Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justices Hugo Black, Abe Fortas, and John Marshall
Harlan.
Palm Beach socialite Mary Alice Firestone, whose divorce case
was as filled with sexual adventure as the Pulitzer divorce trial a
decade later, was held to be a "private figure." 5 The Supreme
Court took back its suggestion that private individuals involved in
matters of public interest would be treated as public figures. 2 One
judge noted the baffling array of "public figure" decisions and declared, "Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall. '27 The Court also subjected newsroom procedures
to the discovery process, which gave plaintiffs the chance to argue
"reckless disregard for the truth" on the basis of editing changes,
flaws in a reporter's notes, or curtailment of an investigation.2 8
This in turn helped plaintiffs survive motions for summary judgment and get their claims to juries, which seemed to show growing
antagonism toward an institution so powerful that it could instigate the downfall of a President.2 The "damages" at issue in a
libel case are rarely economic, because the focus is on damage to
reputation rather than lost earnings or medical bills. Thus, juries
have greater flexibility to return large verdicts, perhaps engaging in
their own form of press-bashing.
Something else has been going on with no explicit discussion in
the cases. In developing a standard of care in libel cases, courts
sometimes have imposed their own romantic notions about journalistic practices or unskeptically applied the perceived standards
of traditional mainstream newspapers. Plaintiffs have discovered
newspaper codes of ethics, which are every bit as aspirational as
the ethical considerations in the lawyers' Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, and have used those codes to cross-examine reporters
and editors on what standards they failed to meet. Worst of all,
some courts have imposed extraordinary standards that bear no relation to practices in even the most fastidious newsrooms.
25. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), afl'd, 580
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
29. Professor Smolla says plaintiffs recover in one-third to one-half of all tort trials but
in 55% to 85% of all libel trials. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 73.
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Perhaps the best example is the decision by a three-judge panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit in Tavoulareas v. Washington
Post Co.3 0 Judge George MacKinnon, joined by Judge Antonin
Scalia, referred to testimony that Bob Woodward, who went from
Watergate reporter to a senior editor at the Post, sought "holy shit
stories" from his investigative reporters.3 1 Judge MacKinnon said a
"reasonable inference" from the statement "is that Woodward, as
editor, wanted from his reporters the same kind of stories on which
he built his own reputation: high-impact investigative stories of
wrongdoing. "32 Whether this is called "hardhitting investigative
journalism" or "sophisticated muckraking," the judge added, the
evidence is relevant in determining reckless disregard for the
truth.,s The judge's reasoning flatly contradicts the tradition of robust criticism that dates back to colonial times and was reaffirmed
in Sullivan. It implies that newspapers should be satisfied with reporting what is given to them, not taking it upon themselves to
ferret out skeletons in people's closets. It is nothing more than a
nostalgic preference for the unskeptical journalism of another era.
Judge Scalia also imposed his own peculiar standard of courtly
journalism in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, in which oldtime
muckraking columnist Jack Anderson was the defendant. The
judge wrote that a jury could have found malice in Mr. Anderson's
failure to look his source in the eye rather than simply interviewing
him over the telephone.3 5 A similar standard was applied by the
South Carolina Supreme Court when it held a reporter negligent
for checking the plaintiff's criminal record through a telephone call
to the prosecutor rather than viewing the public record himself or
contacting the plaintiff, with whom he was acquainted. 6 Another
court deemed it negligent for a reporter to rely on a police information service rather than the actual police record.3 7 All three
cases reflect ignorance about normal newsroom practice. An enor30. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 763 F.2d 1472, reh'g en banc granted, 763 F.2d
1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As this Review went to press, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned the panel's decision. 55
U.S.L.W. 2503.
31. Id. at 121.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
35. Id. at 1579.
36. Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 292 S.E.2d 23, 24 (S.C.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944
(1982).
37. Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 989 (1981).
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mous amount of reporting, including "investigative" reporting, is
done by telephone. A requirement of personal visits for every significant interview would not only bog down every story (which perhaps is the intent of Judge Scalia, who has never voted in favor of
the press in a libel case on appeal"), it would render more difficult
the very fact-checking process that the courts increasingly demand.
None of this begins to take into account the problem of the private defendant, the ordinary citizen who is unversed in the complexities of libel law and who is accustomed to speaking his mind
without benefit of counsel. The popular perception of libel law (a
perception unintentionally encouraged by Professor Smolla's focus
on celebrated cases) is that libel is a battle of titans-William
Westmoreland and Mike Wallace; the president of Mobil Oil and
the Washington Post; Jerry Falwell and Bob Guccione; Wayne
Newton and NBC. Yet the intricate legalisms of free speech are
inflicted on the the obscure as well as the famous.
A fine example is Nodar v. Galbreath,"'a libel case brought by a
schoolteacher who said she was defamed by a student's father. Dissatisfied with the teacher's performance, the father complained
first to the teacher and various school officials. Getting no response, he then took his complaints regarding the curriculum, the
teacher's grading, and her alleged verbal abuse of his son to a
meeting of the school board where he made the alleged defamatory
remarks. A jury awarded the teacher $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. An intermediate appellate
court affirmed, 40 but the Florida Supreme Court reversed and declared the communication privileged. 1
II.

A MATTER OF JOURNALISTIC FORM

As Professor Smolla suggests, to some extent press defendants
are hoist on their own petard. Journalism is no longer the roughand-tumble occupation of sensation-seeking rummies whose ac38.

Schmidt, Rehnquist and Scalia: 'Libel defendants cannot anticipate sympathetic

treatment from the nominees,' AM. Soc'Y

OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

BULL., July/Aug. 1986, at

22.
39. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
40. Nodar v. Galbreath, 429 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
41. Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 803. The Florida Supreme Court held that public school teachers are not public officials, id. at 808, and discussed express malice, which is different from
actual malice and necessary for a plaintiff to prove in order to defeat a defendant's privilege
to publish a defamatory statement. Id. at 811.
For an excellent review of the privilege defense, see Rahdert & Snyder, Rediscovering
Florida's Common Law Defenses to Libel and Slander, 11 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1981).
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counts of the same event vary from competitor to competitor, as
depicted in The Front Page. The tone is more oracular now. Walter Cronkite declared, "That's the way it is." Editors write columns about their fairness and fact-checking. Watergate was in
some respects a battle of credibility between a newspaper and a
president, and the newspaper won.
Yet the reach of the press often exceeds its grasp. Newspapers,
at best, report only the best obtainable version of the truth. A
more honest appraisal is that newspapers report a large number of
facts, assertions, and ideas and sometimes draw their own conclusions from them. Reporters may be taken in by sources, or may
feel forced by newspaper convention to report statements known
to be misleading or untrue. When President Eisenhower had a
heart attack, reporters-and, through them, the world-were told
by an official spokesman that he had a "chill."" 2 President Reagan
said on national television that more people were receiving food
stamps than ever before, when the number actually had dropped
by 400,000. 48 These statements, although false, appeared in newspapers; it was enough that someone important had said them. Particularly with respect to news events in the making, facts are often
difficult to determine on deadline. Sometimes truth is simply unknowable, and newspapers, like people in everyday life, must make
do with judgments based on available facts which are not always
consistent. In part because of newspapers' own self-promotion,
however, people put heavy demands on journalism. "Not only do
they expect it to be entertaining, they expect it to be true," wrote
Lewis Lapham of Harper's in an article on jury verdicts in libel
4
cases.

4

If newspapers could more clearly communicate the restrictions
under which articles were written-and perhaps offer the explanations, often quite good, for publishing them despite their incompleteness-readers might better understand and tolerate error."
Yet the concept of the "objective" story, divorced from opinion
42. See Marro, When the Government Tells Lies, COLUM. JOURNALisM REV., Mar./Apr.
1985, at 29.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Lapham, Gilding the News, HARPER'S, July 1981, at 39.
45. An excellent example of this acknowledgment that real truth is unknowable, at least
for now, is a new book about the destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by a Soviet
fighter on September 1, 1983. "I spent the next two years investigating ... and found that
Flight 007 was not on an intelligence-gathering mission for the CIA or any other agency of
the United States or South Korea. But just why the plane ended up hundreds of miles off
course may never be fully understood." S. HESH, THE TARGET Is DESTROYED (1986)
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and free from any personal intrusion by the writer, dominates journalism. The use of this form by the Washington Post in its articles
on William Tavoulareas conveyed to readers (and jurors) that the
newspaper was representing its statements as "facts" instead of
just one conclusion that could be drawn from the facts.
The lead paragraph in reporter Patrick Tyler's story said Mr.
Tavoulareas "set up his son five years ago as a partner in a London
based shipping management firm that has since done millions of
dollars in business operating Mobil-owned ships under exclusive,
no bid contracts.""' The son, Peter, was only twenty-four years old
when the shipping firm, Atlas Maritime Corp., was started. He had
recently graduated from Columbia business school and was making
$16,500 a year as a trainee-executive for a Greek shipping company
run by George Commas, who became an important source for the
Post story. It seems that Mobil in 1974 was concerned that Saudi
Arabia would require oil companies that bought Saudi crude to use
Saudi ships, so Mobil went into a joint venture with prominent
Saudis: Mobil's ships would be chartered, empty and unstaffed, to
the joint venture, then chartered back with crews and provisions.
The vessels would be managed by yet another company, Atlas,
which was a partnership between Mr. Commas and Peter Tavoulareas. Mr. Commas told the Post that the elder Tavoulareas
orchestrated the Atlas venture by asking Mr. Commas to take Peter in as a partner, later used Mobil funds to buy out Mr. Commas,
then sent a Mobil executive to London to help Peter run the company. Mr. Tavoulareas, however, said it was Mr. Commas who
wanted Peter to join Atlas. He also said the Saudi joint venture
and Atlas were created not to help Peter but to protect Mobil from
a Saudi shipping preference. When Peter joined Atlas, Mr. Tavoulareas told Mobil's Conflict-of-Interest Committee and recused
himself from all final decisions on the whole arrangement. Mobil
claimed that Mr. Tavoulareas had nothing to do with the dismissal
of Mr. Commas and that the Mobil executive sent to London was
paid by Atlas, not Mobil.
The Post reported both sides, but the tone of the article-indeed, its very publication-suggested that the Commas version of the story was correct. A good deal of material favorable to
Mr. Tavoulareas was cut during the editing process. A Post copy
(adapted in THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1986, at 47). Hersh describes the various theories and suggests which is most probably true.
46. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 182-83. The facts of the case are recited by Professor
Smolla.

1004 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:993

editor even wrote an internal memo suggesting that part of Tyler's
case against Tavoulareas appeared tenuous. Mr. Tavoulareas
sought a retraction. The Post refused but published a story detailing Mobil's denials of wrongdoing. "I tried to get them to admit
their mistakes," Mr. Tavoulareas said later, "but they're so damn
arrogant."4 7 He sued, just as he had sued Harper's magazine two

years earlier after the editor described him as "always loud," "a
bad actor," and "a Nixon type.

'48

The Harper's suit was settled.

The jury in the Post case brought back a $2.05 million verdict for
Tavoulareas.
Professor Smolla concludes that the jury convicted the Post of
failure to deliver the promised goods:
The headline, and the unmistakable message communicated between the lines, was that William Tavoulareas had done wrong.
The actual text of the Post story, however, did not provide the
necessary clinchers. Although the text told both sides of the story,
and from the literal words alone one could just as well conclude
that Tavoulareas's behavior was perfectly above board and legitimate as that it was insidious and dishonest, all the facts and inferences favorable to Tavoulareas were systematically presented
so as to diminish their force. The one firm conclusion that the
Post did venture to draw-that Tavoulareas had failed to make
disclosures required by federal securities laws-turned out to be
inaccurate.4

Steven Brill of The American Lawyer, whose excellent reporting
may have influenced the post-trial decisions in the case, reported
that the jury had utterly disregarded the law in reaching its verdict.5" Under the leadership of a law-student-to-be, the jury believed it was the newspaper's legal obligation to prove in the article
itself that Mr. Tavoulareas had helped his son. The jury concluded
that the Post failed to do that. The jury also ignored both the
plaintiff's burden to prove falsity" and the reckless disregard standard for public figures. The jury even seemed to turn libel law upside down by deciding to have the Post give the elder Tavoulareas,
47. Id. at 184.
48. Id. at 185.
49. Id. at 190.
50. Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, AM. LAW., Nov.
1982, at 1, 89.
51. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986) (holding plaintiff, where newspaper is defendant, must prove falsity of the defamatory statement).
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the public figure, $2 million and the younger Tavoulareas, a private figure, nothing.
Like the Tavoulareas case, General Westmoreland's case against
CBS was essentially about a report that offered points of view and
conclusions as facts.5 2 CBS, in a documentary in 1982 called "The
Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," accused General Westmoreland of suppressing the truth about the strength of communist forces before the Tet offensive in 1968. The theory was that
estimates of enemy strength were kept low so that the chance of
winning the war would appear more favorable to President Lyndon
Johnson and the rest of the folks back home. In fact, there was a
fierce debate among intelligence officers over troop counts and how
they should be organized, but the documentary simply accepted
one side of that debate and couched it in terms of "deception."
Unlike the Post, CBS made little pretense of fairness. Filmed interviews, including one with General Westmoreland, were edited to
make defenses look almost like confessions.
In another instance, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was
harshly criticized by an Israeli investigative commission for letting
Christian Phalangists enter two Palestinian refugee camps after
the Phalangist leader, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel,
was assassinated. The commission's report referred to General
Sharon's "blunders" in failing to forestall atrocities. Time magazine published an article about the report. A mistake in the article
referred to a secret section of the report, which supposedly included details about General Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family
after the assassination. "Sharon," said the Time article, "also reportedly discussed with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists
to take revenge for the assassination of Bashir, but the details of
the conversation are not known." 58 General Sharon, testifying in
Hebrew before the Israeli commission, said he had discussed the
issue of revenge "etslenu," a Hebrew word that can mean either
"among us" or "by us". The Time correspondent obviously took
the word to mean "by us." General Sharon testified at trial that he
meant it as "among us," in the context of a discussion with other
Israelis. A language expert testified at the trial for an hour and a
half on the meaning of the word." Thus, General Sharon's own
testimony certainly was susceptible to Time's interpretation. On
52.
53.
54.

R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 80.
Id. at 81-82.
Id.
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the other hand, the reporting by the Time correspondent, David
Halevy, was flawed. The anonymous source who supposedly told
him generally about the contents of the secret portion of the report
was never actually asked if it contained the statement about revenge. Instead, Halevy extrapolated from the public portion. Then,
without any serious discussion with an editor about this conclusion, he simply "cleared" the statement for publication without
questioning his source again. As a result, a mere conclusion was
stated as fact."5
If the Tavoulareas verdict bespoke a jury gone berserk, the
Sharon verdict bespoke Solomonic wisdom. United States District
Judge Abraham Sofaer, who carefully separated the issues for the
jury, had everyone in the courtroom stand in tribute to the jury's
wisdom after the final verdict was announced. In serial verdicts,
the jury concluded that: (1) the statement in Time defamed General Sharon, (2) General Sharon had proven that he had not discussed revenge with the Gemayels, and (3) Time did not act with
reckless disregard of the truth and therefore was not liable,
though
66
correspondent Halevy acted "negligently and carelessly."'
Professor Smolla poses the broader question raised by these
cases in the title of his chapter on the Tavoulareas case: "Can Investigative Journalism Ever Be Objective?' 5 7 CBS, Time, and the
Post each had a point of view and in essence were simply making
the case to support that view. Objectivity was merely a form, a
myth. By relying on the objective form, they deceived their readers
and viewers. Time, notes Professor Smolla, told readers it had
learned something "when in fact it had guessed.' 5 8 Bob Woodward
addressed the matter in his testimony for the Post after Mr.
Tavoulareas' lawyer questioned him on why the name of the Saudi
joint venture did not appear until the sixth paragraph of the story:
[T]hat's what this is all about: you people saying, 'Gee, we want
you to write a story this way, we want this included, we want this
included.' You can write a story a million ways or even more than
a million ways. What we do is we process information . . .make
it clear. We are trying to be fair and accurate as we were in this
55. The Westmoreland and Sharon cases are recounted and analyzed in excruciating
detail in a two-part article in The New Yorker. Adler, Annals of Law: Two Trials, THE NEW
YORKER, June 16, 1986, at 42; THE NEW YORKER, June 23, 1986, at 34.
56. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 191-92.
57. Id. at 182.
58. Id. at 96.
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story . . .You're asking a question that hinges on your assumption that you guys dictate how it's done. 5'
The odd thing is that none of the three plaintiffs apparently
would have filed suit had the defendants clearly denoted the statements they made as conclusions or opinions. Professor Smolla observes, "What appeared to irk Tavoulareas and the . . . jury was
the subtle infiltration of judgmental conclusions by the Post in
what. . . purported to be neutral reportage."6 0° It is worth noting
that the charges about General Westmoreland had appeared five
years earlier in Harper's,which is more clearly a magazine of opinion, and no libel suit resulted.
III.

WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

Professor Smolla fails to emphasize one important lesson to be
drawn from the cases he describes: A great deal depends on the
judge. If the judge is someone like Abraham Sofaer, who presided
over the Sharon trial and carefully separated the issues for the jurors, the result is likely to reflect the values and the law set forth
in Sullivan. If the judge is someone like Walter B. Jones, who railroaded the New York Times with his disdain for the Constitution,
the result is likely to reflect the same kind of emotional pressbashing that the Times suffered in the Alabama courtroom in 1960
and that Tom Wicker saw in the Cow Palace in 1964.
Libel is a lottery for the litigants. The reasons for this are scattered through the case studies in Suing the Press, and a summary
of the more common and compelling ones may be useful.
A.

The standards of care are vague.

When does a mistake stop being negligence and become reckless
disregard for the truth? And what conduct is reckless, anyway? Do
we know it when we see it? With such vague concepts, juries are
free to find that the standard, whatever it means, is met.
Moreover, if some judges are applying their own personal preferences about the conduct of journalism as the legal standard, the
cases will continue to be a lottery. Unless the writer knows whether
his judicial editor will be William 0. Douglas or Antonin Scalia, he
cannot know whether the law requires him to drive two hundred
miles to look an interviewee "in the eye." The more baffling the
59.
60.

Id. at 194.
Id. at 191.
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standard of care, the more likely the sort of jury nullification of the
law that occurred in Tavoulareas.
The problem of assessing whether the care was reasonable is
compounded by the simple fact that speech or writing, even by
professionals, is not always precise or literal. All of us have said or
written things that have been misunderstood or have suggested
something different from what we meant, or that is not literally
true. As Bob Woodward said, newspaper articles can be written a
million different ways, and opening them up to reconsideration after years of discovery by lawyers and thorough analysis by linguistic experts is asking more than a "robust" and "uninhibited" press
can deliver." To some extent, this second-guessing of professional
judgment exists in all professional negligence cases, whether it is
medical malpractice or libel. The news media, however, are unique
in their daily presentation of controversy, whether in news articles
or editorials, and in their frequent villification by the highest officials of government. This increases the likelihood that a juror's
feelings toward the news media in general and the defendant news
organization in particular will be transported into a verdict on the
alleged libel.
B.

Damages are almost entirely intangible.

There are rarely medical bills or lost wages in a libel case. A
plaintiff is compensated for loss of reputation, which is usually left
largely to the speculation of the jurors. Libel also conjures up other
sorts of damages that have been controversial in recent tort law.
Mental anguish and emotional distress have been compensated
even in the absence of any damage to reputation.2 Defamation, it
has been said, is the only tort that allows "substantial recovery
without proof of injury."" The type of harm, moreover, can vary.
General Westmoreland suffered in his public image but may have
lost nothing in his relationships with his friends. A more obscure
person might suffer among business acquaintances, but those who
did not know him would be unlikely even to remember the libel.
Commissioner Sullivan probably won greater esteem among his acquaintances in Montgomery after the Times advertisement ap61. Id. at 194.
62. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
63. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747, 748
(1984).
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peared, and people who did not know him would not have connected him with the advertisement.'
C. Damages for an erroneous, defamatory statement are
difficult to separate from damages for true, though harmful,
information presented in the same story.
The Sharon case never reached the point of a damages assessment, but it is an example of this sort of case. The Time story
accurately reported the harsh assessment of General Sharon by the
Israeli commission investigating the Phalangist massacre. Only one
sentence was really contested. The article without that sentence
was quite enough to significantly damage General Sharon's reputation, but the magazine had no liability for that. General Sharon
could recover only for the additional harm caused by the one incorrect sentence. The tone of the advertisement at issue in Sullivan was likewise harsh and, at least outside the South, might have
significantly damaged the reputations of Alabama officials generally. The errors, however, made little difference. Did it matter that
the officials arrested Martin Luther King four times instead of
seven, or that police were at the college campus in abundance but
did not literally "ring" it, or that the cause of the demonstration
was slightly different, or that the song was incorrectly identified?
Because the libel case focuses on one or two or even a half-dozen
errors, those errors take on extraordinary importance to the jurors
and are valued, for purposes of a verdict, out of all proportion to
their weight in the total article.
D. Opinion loses some of its protection when presented as a
statement of fact.
At first blush, this may seem perfectly acceptable; news organizations should clearly indicate that they are expressing opinion
and not truth. That would not conform, however, to the way all of
us act. We may believe some things so strongly that we take them
as fact or express them as such. Mary McCarthy's statements
about Lillian Hellman fall into this category. So would Mike Wallace's statement that General Westmoreland "deceived" the American people. Holding publishers and speakers liable for expressing
64.

See id. at 764-66.
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"ideological facts," as Professor Smolla calls them, is simply punishing them for expressing their ideas.~
Satire" and "docudramas" 7 likewise state as fact what often is
fictionalized, but those are yet another form-increasingly popular-of presenting ideas and theories. The film Missing, for example, was based on the real disappearance of a young American
writer in Chile and his father's belief that the United States played
a role in the disappearance. The movie was political and reflected
intense anger, but it clearly had to fictionalize scenes (without so
indicating) where facts were not known. The American ambassador, protesting his innocence, sued for libel.0 8 We may never know
who is right. Does that mean that a filmmaker is not free to speculate on the basis of the evidence and his conclusions from it, or
does it mean that filmmakers can't go around smearing officials'
reputations on the basis of speculation alone?6 9
The law cannot be a literary critic. Just as it has no place judging Mary McCarthy's stinging remarks about Lillian Hellman, it
cannot become the arbiter of literary and journalistic forms. It is
one thing for a jury to say that a newspaper will be guilty of libel if
it simply makes up a story that a famous actress was boisterous
and drunk in a fashionable restaurant. It is quite another thing to
say that historical novels and "docudramas," if not true in every
particular or if accepting a controversial view of history, can subject the writer to a libel suit.
65. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 249. But see Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300
(8th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
66. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983); see also R SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 163-64.
67. R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 138-59.
68. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The ambassador sued the
author and publisher of the book on which the movie was based, as well as the flimmakers,
seeking $150 million in damages. The court granted motions for summary judgment in favor
of the author and publisher. Id. The court ultimately granted the filmmakers' motion for
judgment on the pleadings, finding the film not reasonably susceptible to the defamatory
meaning alleged in the complaint. Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372 (D.C.N.Y.
1985).
69. In such a case, where the facts are simply unknowable, the Supreme Court seems to
give the advantage to the media defendant. The Court recently held that plaintiffs have the
burden of proving falsity and noted that burden of proof "is the deciding factor only when
the evidence is ambiguous." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1560
(1986). This presumbably means that the film Missing, even if its entire premise is false,
would be protected from a libel verdict, although the Court reserved ruling on whether Philadelphia Newspapers applies to nonmedia defendants. Id. at 1565 n.4.
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Daily journalism surely needs improvement. Its most fundamental need is not, as some might argue, greater "objectivity" but
rather greater understanding. For all the talk about the aggressiveness of the Sam Donaldsons and Mike Wallaces there is little to
government coverage, at any level, besides a description of daily
events, many of which are staged for the specific purpose of attracting news coverage. Too many newspaper articles are breathless scoops. Their tone is one of shock that something occurred or
was discovered, not exploration of how it occurred or explanation
of what it is all about. Reporters as a group, often accused of being
"liberal," are in truth populists, susceptible to the same emotional
cliches that motivate the general population. Few of them are confident enough of their own depth of knowledge on a subject-or
possess sufficient depth of knowledge on a subject-to cast off the
journalistic conventions of "objectivity," which so bogged down the
Post in the Tavoulareas story, and to move past the contentious
rhetoric of opposing sides into a more insightful, indeed more
truthful, explanation. (Those who complain that the press thrives
on conflict do not realize the constraints of "objectivity." If President Reagan offers a statistic that is utterly incorrect, a reporter is
loathe simply to write, "The President was wrong, and here is the
real figure." The reporter must seek out a prominent Democrat
and quote him as saying the President was wrong.) Journalists are
more intelligent and better trained than they were in Front Page
days, but many of the leading lights of journalism still see a need
for more rigorous analysis, more thorough explanations, and more
70
dispassionate judgments.
Journalists who read Suing the Press should appreciate this
need. Looking past the legal issues in Westmoreland and Sharon
and other cases discussed by Professor Smolla, a journalist must
recognize that there were serious failings of craft in the articles
involved. Correcting the problem will require not timidity but
more aggressiveness.
Lawyers and judges who read Suing the Press should come to
realize that every harm resulting from errors of speech and press is
not compensable through libel awards. They must also recognize
that jurors and judges-to say nothing of lawyers-are being
smothered by the complexity, vagueness, and uncertainty of libel
law. Judges, particularly, need to realize that libel is not just another tort, but that it infringes on a basic human need to speak
70.

See
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one's mind and a fundamental constitutional protection that lets
people do it.
Suing the Press offers few specific answers to the libel conundrum, but it contributes to understanding on both sides.

